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COMMENTS
Preserving the Essence of Zadvydas v. Davis
in the Midst of a National Tragedy
I. INTRODUCTION
September 11, 2001, marked the beginning of a renewed cycle of
tension within American society. The suicide attacks against the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon define a moment in history that has once
more instilled fear of anything and anyone that may disrupt the stability
of America. Throughout history, the United States has suffered many
similar periods of national tension that have generated paranoia of the
unfamiliar. Unfortunately, society and the government deal with this
tension by discriminating against those most vulnerable. Those most
susceptible to discrimination are noncitizens in the United States.
Whether present legally or illegally, all noncitizens are at risk of becom-
ing targets of discrimination because of the limited rights guaranteed to
them under the Constitution.
On June 28, 2001, the Supreme Court issued Zadvydas v. Davis,' a
decision holding unconstitutional the indefinite detention of lawful resi-
dent aliens awaiting removal from the United States. This landmark
decision recognized noncitizens as persons entitled to constitutional pro-
tection. After September 11, 2001, however, the progress that Zadvydas
could have achieved in the area of indefinite detention of aliens is in
danger of becoming stymied. This Comment will discuss the present
status of aliens under the Constitution, specifically their status within the
realm of indefinite detention. Furthermore, it will address the new pre-
ventive measures implemented by the Government in response to the
terrorist attacks while considering the Supreme Court's decision in
Zadvydas v. Davis. The Comment will also attempt to demonstrate how
the tragedy of September 11 will most likely transform the latest break-
through case in the field of alien rights into a powerful tool for discrimi-
nation against aliens as a means for the nation to deal with the tension of
the current crisis produced by the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001.
1. 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (5-4 decision).
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II. THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT
The admissibility and exclusion of foreigners from the United
States is governed by the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).2
Upon acquiring a visa from the American Embassy located in his or her
country of origin, an alien is able to enter the United States either as an
immigrant sponsored by a family member or employer,3 or as a nonim-
migrant entering as a tourist or student.4 If a family member or
employer sponsors an alien, that alien automatically enters as a lawful
permanent resident. A nonimmigrant is expected to leave the United
States after a predetermined period of time. Any nonimmigrant who
remains in the United States beyond the time permitted is present ille-
gally, yet may petition for an adjustment of status, which allows a non-
immigrant to become a lawful permanent resident.5
All aliens, whether entering as immigrants or nonimmigrants, must
undergo an inspection for admission after arriving at a port of entry in
the United States.6 The inspection for admission involves an inquiry
encompassing the health related danger or criminal danger that an alien
may pose to the community.7 If an inspector has reason to believe that
grounds exist to charge an alien as inadmissible, then the alien is not
allowed to enter the United States.8 From a port of entry, an inadmissi-
ble alien is detained and placed in removal proceedings.9 The INA pro-
vides for a waiver of the detention of an excludable alien if the Attorney
General considers it to be in the national interest to do so.' 0 These aliens
are allowed into the United States as parolees.' ' The status of parolee is
a legal fiction because a person is physically allowed into the commu-'
nity, yet has not been legally admitted; therefore, a parolee is not legally
present in the United States, even though he or she may live in the
United States for several years.' 2 The Attorney General may revoke
parolee status at any time, thereby placing an excludable alien in
2. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2000).
3. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 203, 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (2000).
4. See id. § 101(a)(15), 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(15).
5. Id. § 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255.
6. Id. § 235(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a).
7. Id. § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a).
8. Id.
9. Id. § 236(c)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(A).
10. Id. § 212(d)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(1). Specifically, the Attorney General may waive
inadmissibility due to urgent humanitarian reasons or for significant public benefit. Id.
§ 212(d)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A).
I1. Id. § 212(d)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. § I 182(d)(5)(A).
12. Id. See also Margaret H. Taylor, Detained Aliens Challenging Conditions of Con finement
and the Porous Border of the Plenary Power Doctrine, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1087, 1096
(1995).
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removal proceedings. 3
Any alien who is present within the United States, either lawfully
or unlawfully, can be deported. Such an alien is considered deportable as
opposed to excludable because he or she is present within the United
States.'4 A lawful permanent resident or illegal alien can be placed in
removal proceedings if he or she leaves the United States and upon
return is found to be inadmissible. 5 Additionally, an alien is deemed
deportable if he or she has been convicted of a criminal offense.' 6 After
serving a criminal sentence, the alien is taken into custody and placed in
removal proceedings to determine whether the alien will be deported to
the alien's country of origin.' 7
Although categorized separately under the INA, both deportable
and excludable aliens must undergo the same removal proceedings
under section 240 of the INA.' 8 Once an alien is charged with either
inadmissibility or deportability, the alien appears before an immigration
judge who decides whether to exclude or deport the alien based on evi-
dence and witness testimony."' An alien in removal proceedings has a
right to counsel, an opportunity to cross-examine adverse witnesses, and
an opportunity to examine the evidence against him or her, with the
exception of national security information.2 ° If an immigration judge
finds the alien to be excludable or deportable, the alien is ordered
removed and is detained under section 241 of the INA.2' An order of
removal is not subject to judicial review.22
The arrangements for removal from the United States must take
place within ninety days from the date of the order for removal, which is
called the removal period.2 ' During the ninety-day removal period, no
alien can be released from detention.24 Under the INA, an alien may be
13. Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 212(d)(5)(A) & 236(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(b) (2000).
14. Id. § 237(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a).
15. Id. § 237(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1).
16. Id. § 237(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2). Such criminal offenses include crimes of moral
turpitude, controlled substance possession, domestic violence, and aggravated felonies as defined
in section 101(a)(43) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Id. Compare Immigration and
Nationality Act § 212(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(2) (2000), with Immigration and Nationality Act
§ 237(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (2000) (noting that although the types of crimes listed under
the deportability section of the INA are similar to the crimes in the excludability section, the
gravity of the offenses are more severe in the deportability section).
17. Id. § 236(c)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(B).
18. Id. § 240(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(2).
19. Id. § 240(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1).
20. Id. § 240(b)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4).
21. d. § 241(a)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(l)(A):
22. Id. § 242(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2).
23. Id. § 241(a)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(l)(A).
24. Id. § 241(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (a)(2).
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detained beyond the ninety-day removal period if the alien fails to make
arrangements for his or her departure. Most important for reasons of
the present analysis, however, is section 241(a)(6), which allows the
Attorney General to detain beyond the removal period any criminal alien
considered a "risk to the community or unlikely to comply with the
order of removal. 26 Although an order of removal is not subject to
judicial review,27 issues of indefinite detention have reached the courts
through aliens' petitions for writs of habeas corpus, claiming wrongful
detention beyond the removal period. Within the context of habeas peti-
tions, courts have been able to define the due process rights that aliens
are entitled to within the area of indefinite detention.
III. THE JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE DUE PROCESS
RIGHTS OF ALIENS
Aliens do not enjoy the same rights as United States citizens.
Moreover, constitutional rights differ among the different categories of
aliens. Throughout history, the Supreme Court has solidified the notion
that deportable aliens enjoy more due process rights than excludable
aliens.2 8 In essence, an alien's right to procedural due process depends
on the alien's location: 29 if an alien is within United States territory, then
the alien is entitled to some due process, but if the alien is considered
outside the territory, the alien has no due process rights."'
A. The Plenary Power Doctrine
The Supreme Court has justified the limited procedural rights of
deportable aliens and the lack of rights of inadmissible aliens under the
plenary power doctrine.3' The plenary power doctrine is based on the
belief that citizens are responsible for choosing the composition of the
national community, and therefore Congress, as the community's repre-
sentative, has full power to determine immigration policy.32 The Court
deems matters concerning immigration law to be within the sole discre-
tion of the political branches, 33 and limits its role to ensuring that a mini-
mum standard of due process is met without imposing procedures that
25. Id. § 241(a)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(I)(C).
26. Id. § 241(a)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 123 1(a)(6).
27. Id. § 242(a)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A)(i).
28. Taylor, supra note 12, at 1095.
29. Michael Scaperlanda, Are We that Far Gone?: Due Process and Secret Deportation
Proceedings, 7 SrAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 23, 24 (1996).
30. Id.
31. Taylor, supra note 12, at 1128.
32. See Scaperlanda, supra note 29, at 24.
33. Taylor, supra note 12, at 1128.
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displace congressional policy choices.34 The history of the plenary
power doctrine has its roots in the nineteenth century when the Supreme
Court upheld discriminatory restrictions imposed on Chinese immigrants
through the Chinese Exclusion Act. 35 Although due process rights have
expanded overall in the past one hundred years, consideration of due
process rights for aliens in the area of immigration law remains
underdeveloped.36
The Supreme Court's decision in United States ex rel. Knauff v.
Shaughnessy demonstrates the Court's use of the plenary power doctrine
to deny due process rights to excludable aliens.37 In Knauff, the German
wife of a United States citizen was excluded from entering the United
States because of security reasons. 38 The government suspected that
Knauff's admission would be prejudicial to the interests of the United
States and excluded Knauff without a hearing.39 The government kept
the exclusion charges confidential.4 ° The issue before the Supreme
Court was whether the Attorney General could exclude Knauff without a
hearing.4 According to the Court, entry into the United States is a priv-
ilege, not a right,42 and Congress's authorized procedure for entry is the
extent of due process afforded to an alien seeking admission.43 Because
Congress delegated the power to exclude to the executive, the delegated
party's decision is final and conclusive, allowing no judicial review of
the decision. 44 In Knauff, the confidential nature of the information
against Knauff justified the Attorney General's decision to exclude the
alien without a hearing.45
The Court especially has invoked the plenary power doctrine when
deciding issues concerning the detention of aliens. Shortly after the
Supreme Court's decision in Knauff, the Court reviewed the issue of
indefinite detention of aliens in Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel.
Mezei.4 6 In Mezei, a Romanian citizen was confined on Ellis Island for a
34. Scaperlanda, supra note 29, at 24 (citing Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34-35 (1982)
(finding that a lawful permanent resident alien can lose his protected status if absence from the
United States is extended)).
35. Taylor, supra note 12, at 1128.
36. See id. at 1129.
37. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
38. Id. at 539-40.
39. Id. at 540.
40. Id. at 544.
41. Id. at 540.
42. Id. at 542.
43. Id. at 544.
44. Id. at 543.
45. Id. at 544.
46. 345 U.S. 206, 207 (1953).
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period of twenty-one months with no definite removal date.47 Mezei
had lived in the United States from 1923 to 1948, but was denied re-
entry after a two-year trip to Romania to visit his sick mother. 8 The
Attorney General ordered the exclusion without a hearing based on con-
fidential information concerning Mezei, the disclosure of which would
be prejudicial to the public interest.49 After Mezei filed several habeas
corpus petitions, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's order
releasing Mezei on conditional parole.5" Under the plenary power doc-
trine, however, the Supreme Court held that the power of the Attorney
General to exclude is unquestionable. 5'
According to the Court, Mezei was not entitled to a hearing because
aliens are only entitled to as much due process as Congress deems
appropriate.52 Furthermore, allowing Mezei to be released on parole
was irrational since the Attorney General had certified Mezei as a secur-
ity risk.53 Because Mezei was an entering alien, regardless of his previ-
ous residency in the United States, the Attorney General had a right to
order Mezei's exclusion without a hearing and to detain him indefinitely
based on security-related evidence.54
Knauff and Mezei are the seminal cases regarding the constitutional
rights and detention of aliens. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals fol-
lowed Supreme Court precedent on the matter in Barrera-Echavarria v.
Rison.5 - Barrera-Echavarria involved an excludable Cuban detainee
with no prospects of repatriation to Cuba.5 6 The district court granted
the detainee a writ of habeas corpus that the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals later reversed.57 Relying on Knauff and Mezei, the Ninth Cir-
cuit reasoned that aliens had no right to be free from detention.58 It
based its conclusion on the principle that excludable aliens are not enti-
tled to any procedural due process rights at all. 5 ' As seen in Knauff,
Mezei, and Barrera-Echavarria, the plenary power doctrine reigns
within the area of admission and exclusion of aliens. The doctrine justi-
47. Id. at 207-09.
48. Id. at 208.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 209.
51. Id. at 210-11.
52. Id. at 212.
53. Id. at 216.
54. Id. at 212-13.
55. 44 F.3d 1441, 1447 (9th Cir. 1995).
56. Id. at 1442.
57. The Ninth Circuit had originally affirmed the issuance of the writ, 21 F.3d 314 (9th Cir.
1994), but later reversed on rehearing. 44 F.3d 1441 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc).
58. Barrera-Echavarria, 44 F.3d at 1448.
59. Id. at 1449.
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fies the courts in allowing Congress to create policies within immigra-
tion law that limit the due process rights of aliens.
B. The Aliens' Rights Tradition
Another tradition within the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, how-
ever, has operated parallel to the plenary power doctrine. The aliens'
rights tradition, contrary to the plenary power doctrine, considers aliens
as persons entitled to the same due process rights as citizens. The
aliens' rights tradition cases, unlike the plenary power doctrine cases,
have dealt with issues that concern aliens present in the United States,
and have not dealt with the admission and exclusion issues of immigra-
tion law. The aliens' rights tradition, nevertheless, has played an impor-
tant role in advocating the rights of all aliens.
The first cases within the aliens' rights tradition involved discrimi-
natory practices against Chinese aliens. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins,6 ° for
example, a San Francisco, California ordinance ordered the closing of
over two-hundred laundry establishments owned by lawful permanent
resident Chinese, while eighty similar establishments owned by United
States citizens remained operative. One Chinese alien was detained for
failing to abide by the ordinance. The Supreme Court reviewed whether
Chinese aliens were entitled to equal protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court ultimately held that Chinese aliens were enti-
tled to Fourteenth Amendment due process protections and that the ordi-
nance violated the due process rights of the Chinese aliens.6' The only
purpose of the ordinance, according to the Court, was to discriminate
against the Chinese laundry owners on account of race and nationality.62
The Fourteenth Amendment, therefore, applies to persons in general, not
to citizens exclusively.63
The Court likewise advanced the aliens' rights tradition in Wong
Wing v. United States.64 An 1888 federal act contained a provision
authorizing the detention of illegally present Chinese aliens in the
United States.65 The aliens' imprisonment sentence was hard labor, to
last for a period not exceeding one year before removal,6 6 and their
detention was effectuated without a trial by jury.6 7 The Supreme Court
struck down the act holding that while arrest, detention, and deportation
60. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
61. Id. at 367.
62. Id. at 374.
63. Id. at 373.
64. 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
65. Id. at 229.
66. Id. at 233.
67. id. at 234.
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were all acceptable actions within Congress's power,68 Congress does
not have the right to inflict punishment and deprivation of property and
liberty without a trial by jury.69 According to the Court, the lack of
procedural due process in this instance went beyond the constitutional
sphere of legislative power.7 °
Although the aliens' rights tradition cases are significant in recog-
nizing that aliens are entitled to due process rights, the aliens' rights
tradition has never taken a definitive shape that could viably counter the
plenary power doctrine. 7' The aliens' rights tradition cases merely sug-
gest that aliens are entitled to equal protection and due process only to
the extent of Congress's power to admit, exclude, or deport aliens.
Therefore, a definitive boundary exists between the plenary power doc-
trine and the aliens' rights tradition based on issues that fall either inside
or outside Congress's power in creating immigration policy. Under the
aliens' rights tradition, other than its plenary power in immigration
issues, Congress cannot afford aliens present in the United States less
due process than United States citizens. In short, the level of an alien's
due process depends on whether the alien is attempting to enter the
United States or whether the alien is legally or illegally present within
the United States.
C. The Convergence of the Plenary Power Doctrine
and the Aliens' Rights Tradition
While Knauff and Mezei upheld the plenary power of Congress in
immigration matters, these cases have been criticized for their sweeping
language regarding the general constitutional status of aliens when the
sole question in both cases involved Congress's power to admit and
exclude.72 Other cases, such as Mathews v. Diaz,7 3 have applied the
plenary power doctrine to matters outside immigration, which has not
only led to confusion between the two doctrines, but has also led to an
unfortunate limitation of due process rights of aliens present within the
United States.
In Mathews v. Diaz, the Supreme Court upheld a statute denying
Medicare benefits to those lawful permanent residents who had lived in
the United States for less than five years. 4 The Court reasoned that not
all aliens are entitled to enjoy the advantages of citizenship such as
68. Id. at 237.
69. Id.
70. See id.
71. Taylor, supra note 12, at 1135.
72. Id. at 1132.
73. 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
74. Id.
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receiving federal benefits.75 It was therefore reasonable for Congress to
make an alien's eligibility depend on both the character and duration of
his residency.76 The Mathews decision, however, is criticized by many
as a misuse of the plenary power doctrine, transforming a case involving
eligibility for government benefits into a case concerning admissibility
and exclusion.77 Mathews v. Diaz is just one of the many cases that has
failed to delineate the boundary between the plenary power doctrine and
the aliens' rights tradition.78 In effect, no consistent precedent exists to
determine when aliens are entitled to constitutional protection.7 9
Ironically, the same convergence of doctrines also has led to the
advancement of aliens' due process rights. For example, Jean v. Nel-
son is a monumental case within the aliens' rights tradition that disre-
garded the plenary power doctrine in dealing with an immigration
matter. During the explosion of immigration to South Florida from
Cuba and Haiti in the 1980s, the Immigration and Naturalization Service
was forced to release aliens on parole due to administrative difficulties.8 '
Many Cubans were granted parole, but Haitians were ordered detained
until the processing of their status.82 Haitians claimed that their deten-
tion constituted national origin discrimination, considered unlawful
under the equal protection clause.8 3 In Jean, an Eleventh Circuit panel
held that the detention policy with regard to Haitians was discrimina-
tory.84 In reaching this decision, the panel concluded that the Haitians'
claims in no way relate to Congress and the executive branch's authority
over immigration. In short, the panel decision invigorated the aliens'
rights tradition in determining that the INS could not discriminate
among aliens based on nationality. Applying Mezei, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit, en banc, vacated the panel decision, holding that the plenary power
doctrine should govern.85 The ultimate success of Jean v. Nelson, there-
fore, was shortlived and the progress that the case could have contrib-
uted to the aliens' rights tradition was truncated.
The case of Lynch v. Cannatella86 likewise brought the aliens'
75. Id. at 78.
76. Id. at 78-79.
77. Taylor, supra note 12, at 1138.
78. Id. at 1138-39.
79. Id. at 1139.
80. 711 F.2d 1455 (11 th Cir. 1983).
81. See generally id. at 1462-65.
82. Id. at 1462-65.
83. Id. at 1468; see also Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. 973, 1000 (S.D. Fla. 1982).
84. 711 F.2d at 1509.
85. Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957 (11 th Cir. 1984). The Supreme Court refused to reach the
constitutional question on prudential grounds. Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846 (1985).
86. 810 F.2d 1363 (5th Cir. 1987).
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rights tradition to an immigration case. Lynch's progress, like Jean's in
the panel decision, was curtailed due to a distortion and misinterpreta-
tion of Lynch's holding by later cases.8 7 In Lynch, harbor police offi-
cials mistreated Jamaican stowaways upon discovering the aliens' plan
to enter the United States illegally.88 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
used Yick Wo and Wong Wing to hold that the claims of aliens held in
detention could be decided under the aliens' rights tradition.89 Accord-
ing to the court, the alien stowaways were entitled to Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendment protections." Although the court acknowledged that
the status of aliens under the Constitution was different from that of
citizens, 9' the court nevertheless held that these aliens were still entitled
to constitutional protection as persons.92 The alien stowaways, there-
fore, should be free from gross physical abuse at the hands of federal
officials.93
Subsequent cases, however, misinterpreted Lynch and created a
"gross physical abuse" exception to the general denial of due process
rights to excludable aliens.94 In all other instances, an excludable alien
is not afforded any rights. In other words, subsequent cases upheld the
plenary power doctrine by narrowing the holding of Lynch and interpret-
ing the case to stand for the exact opposite of what Lynch was attempt-
ing to achieve under the aliens' rights tradition.95 As a result, the
progress forged in the aliens' rights tradition was abandoned, giving way
to a standard that actually limits the rights of aliens to challenge the
conditions of their confinement. 96
The recent Supreme Court decision of Zadvydas v. Davis,97 con-
cerning the indefinite detention of permanent resident aliens, is another
case in the line of Jean and Lynch that has contributed to the aliens'
rights tradition. Factually, Zadvydas is significant because for the first
time the Supreme Court dealt with the fate of a deportable alien as
opposed to an excludable alien. Most significant, however, is
Zadvydas's doctrinal impact, extending to all persons the right to be free
from indefinite detention. While asserting the rights of aliens, Zadvydas
87. See generally Taylor, supra note 12.
88. Lynch, 810 F.2d at 1367.
89. Id. at 1373.
90. Id. at 1374.
91. ld. at 1373.
92. Id. at 1372.
93. Id. at 1374.
94. Taylor, supra note 12, at 1148-50.
95. Id. (referring to Adras v. Nelson, 917 F.2d 1552 (1 1th Cir. 1990); Medina v. O'Neill, 838
F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1988)).
96. Taylor, supra note 12, at 1155.
97. 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (5-4 decision).
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also contains language that can limit its holding to deportable aliens
only. As a result of this dicta, Zadvydas runs the risk of becoming as
misconstrued as Lynch v. Cannatella. Unfortunately, the essence of
Zadvydas is in danger because of the national tragedy produced by the
September 11 terrorist attacks.
'IV. ZADVYDAS V. DAVIS
Under the INA, the Attorney General may detain an alien beyond
the ninety-day removal period during which an alien must arrange for
his or her departure from the United States.98 Zadvydas v. Davis, how-
ever, presents the quandary of an alien who cannot return to his or her
country of origin because of the lack of a repatriation agreement
between the country of origin and the United States. In cases such as
these, an alien remains in detention for an indefinite period of time,
often for a period longer than the criminal sentence for which the deport-
able alien was ordered removed. Considering that immigration proceed-
ings and detention are civil and not criminal in nature, the inflexibility of
the INA in its reluctance to release removable aliens places the deport-
able alien in a predicament.
Zadvydas consolidated two cases that represented a split in the cir-
cuit courts concerning this indefinite detention issue. 99 Kestutis
Zadvydas, born in Germany of Lithuanian parents, came to the United
States at the age of eight.'"" He became a lawful permanent resident,
and acquired a criminal record for drug crimes, attempted robbery,
attempted burglary, and theft.'' After serving a sixteen-year sentence,
the INS ordered Zadvydas deported to Germany.' °2 Germany, however,
refused to accept Zadvydas.° 3 Zadvydas tried to obtain Lithuanian citi-
zenship through his parents' citizenship, but that petition was likewise
rejected, as was the petition to the Dominican Republic, the country of
his wife's citizenship.'" 4 Kestitus Zadvydas petitioned for a writ of
habeas corpus after being held in detention beyond the ninety-day statu-
tory removal period.' 05 The second case concerned Kim Ho Ma, a
Cambodian who immigrated to the United States at the age of seven.1
0 6
Like Zadvydas, Ma was convicted for criminal acts, including a gang-
98. Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(a)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (2000).
99. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (5-4 decision).





105. Id. at 684-85.
106. Id. at 685.
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related shooting and manslaughter, resulting in his service of a two-year
prison sentence. 10 7 He was subsequently ordered deported to Cambo-
dia.' °8 Ma was also held beyond the ninety-day removal period.0 9
Both Zadvydas and Ma are lawful permanent residents who were
ordered deported after completing their criminal sentences. Both were
held beyond the statutory period for removal, and both petitioned for
writs of habeas corpus. When deciding the same question as to whether
lawful permanent residents could be held in custody for an indefinite
period of time pending removal, however, the Fifth Circuit and the
Ninth Circuit arrived at two different conclusions.
The Ninth Circuit in Ma v. Reno' o held that the INS only had the
authority to detain aliens for a reasonable time beyond the statutory
removal period of ninety days.' If there is no reasonable likelihood
that a foreign government will accept an alien in the reasonably foresee-
able future, then the alien must be released subject to the supervision
procedures outlined in the INA.
1
2
The Fifth Circuit in Zadvydas v. Underdown,"3 on the other hand,
held that the Government has the authority to detain a resident alien
based on his or her danger to the community or flight risk, as long as
efforts to effectuate removal are made and periodic review procedures
are in place. 4 Although a country might not accept an alien, detention
beyond the ninety-day statutory removal period would not constitute
unconstitutional punishment. 5  According to the Fifth Circuit, the
detention of such an alien could be considered a necessary by-product of
the need to expel an unwanted alien, instead of a punitive action.'16
Because of the different conclusions involving the same indefinite
detention issue, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Zadvydas v.
Davis.''7 Under section 241(a)(6) of the INA, the Court held that an
alien who has been ordered removed from the United States cannot be
detained for more than six months after a ninety-day statutory removal
period if there is no possibility that the alien will be removed within the
107. Id.
108. Id. at 685-86.
109. Id. at 685.
110. 208 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2000).
Ill. Id. at 821-22.
112. Id. at 827. The Ninth Circuit indicated that they did not reach the constitutional question
as to whether indefinite detention is a violation of due process. The court chose simply to
construe the statute. Id.
113. 185 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 1999).
114. Id. at 297.
115. Id. at 290.
116. Id.
117. 533 U.S. 678, 686 (2001) (5-4 decision).
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reasonably foreseeable future." 8 After a six-month detention period, a
removable alien may be released under strict supervision.'' 9 This deci-
sion extended due process rights to aliens in the area of indefinite deten-
tion where aliens have traditionally been denied the right to be free from
indefinite detention. 120 Throughout the majority opinion, the Court dis-
pensed the same arguments that had traditionally justified the Attorney
General's power to detain removable aliens indefinitely in order to vali-
date its innovative interpretation of the detention statute.
12 1
Justice Breyer began the majority opinion by asserting the Court's
jurisdiction to hear the consolidated cases under habeas corpus proceed-
ings. 122 Both the Ma and the Zadvydas decisions below originated from
writs of habeas corpus. 123  The Court further asserted jurisdiction in
reviewing the instant deportation orders because the petitioners were not
challenging the Attorney General's discretion within the statute to detain
an alien indefinitely, 1 24 but rather challenging the extent of the Attorney
General's authority under the statute.
125
On the merits, the Court first referred to the post-removal statute
that allows the Attorney General to detain an alien who has been ordered
removed from the United States beyond the removal period. 2 6  In
response to the Government's argument imposing a literal interpretation
of the statute, the Court recognized that the case involved a serious con-
stitutional question.' 27 The Court invoked a "cardinal principle of statu-
tory interpretation," and chose to interpret the statute while avoiding the
constitutional issue. 128
118. Id. at 701.
119. Id.
120. See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953); Barrera-
Echavarria v. Rison, 44 F.3d 1441 (9th Cir. 1995).
121. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(a)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (2000):
An alien ordered removed who is inadmissible ... removable ... or who has been
determined by the Attorney General to be a risk to the community or unlikely to
comply with the order of removal, may be detained beyond the removal period and,
if released, shall be subject to the terms of supervision in paragraph 3.
122. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 687-88.
123. Congress restricted judicial review of immigration matters in 1996, allowing questions of
detention to reach the courts only through petitions for writs of habeas corpus. See id.
124. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(a)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (2000).
125. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 687.
126. Id. at 688. The types of removable aliens that the statute refers to include:
inadmissible aliens, criminal aliens, aliens who have violated their nonimmigrant
status conditions, and aliens removable for certain national security or foreign
relations reasons, as well as any alien "who has been determined by the Attorney
General to be a risk to the community or unlikely to comply with the order of
removal."
Id. (citing Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(a)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (2000)).
127. Id. at 689.
128. Id. The Court usually invokes a "cardinal principle of statutory interpretation" whereby a
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The acknowledgment of a constitutional problem in this case is sig-
nificant because the Court recognized that aliens subject to deportation
are entitled to protection as persons, despite precedent that justified
indefinite detention. In other words, the Court acknowledged the detain-
ees as persons rather than as aliens possessing limited constitutional
rights. Its clarification of an alien's due process rights set the stage for
the Court's ultimate holding-the creation of the six-month reasonable
detention period. The Court reasoned that it was more favorable to con-
strue a limitation within a statute than to invalidate it,'2 9 and limited the
Attorney General's power to detain indefinitely. 30
The Government next contended that the statute allowing indefinite
detention of removable aliens performed a dual purpose that the Court
should consider.' 3 ' First, the Government argued that the statute ensures
that flight-risk aliens would attend future immigration proceedings.' 32
Second, the statute implemented a safeguard against releasing dangerous
aliens into the community. 33 The Court, however, discarded the Gov-
ernment's interpretation of the statute's regulatory goals, reasoning that
where removal is unattainable, a risk of flight is unlikely. 34 Further-
more, it noted that the statute applies to other aliens besides those who
present a danger to the community. 35 The Court clarified that deporta-
tion proceedings were not criminal but civil proceedings, and that deten-
tion of removable aliens is not punitive in nature. In characterizing
deportation proceedings as civil proceedings, and in highlighting the
statute's applicability to removable aliens beyond those who have com-
mitted aggravated felonies, the Court undermined the element of danger
relied upon by the Government. Eliminating the element of danger was
a key component of the Court's rationale for creating a reasonable six-
month detention period that could justify the release of detained aliens
without fear of danger to the community.
This reasonable detention period further evolved from the notion of
the difference between excludable aliens and deportable aliens.
36
Court must first interpret the statute in such a way as to avoid the constitutional question when an




131. Id. at 690.
132. Id. (citing Brief for Respondents, No. 99-7791, at 24).
133. Id. at 690-91.
134. Id. at 690 (citing Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972)).
135. Id. at 691.
136. "We deal here with aliens who were admitted to the United States but subsequently
ordered removed. Aliens who have not yet gained initial admission to this country would present
a very different question." Id. at 682.
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Although Mezei was the seminal case justifying the Attorney General's
power to detain removable aliens for an indefinite period, the Court dis-
tinguished it based on the difference between aliens who have not been
admitted to the United States and those removable aliens who have been
admitted and become permanent residents. Mezei was an alien who had
lived in the United States for twenty-five years, but was found excluda-
ble after undergoing inspection for admissibility upon his return to the
United States.' 37 Therefore, he was classified as an excludable alien and
not as a deportable alien.' 38 As an excludable alien, Mezei was consid-
ered not to have "entered" the United States although he was physically
present in United States territory. 139 Because Kim Ho Ma and Kestutis
Zadvydas were classified as deportable aliens rather than as excludable
aliens, the Court limited Mezei to its facts, and easily disposed of the
Government's leading case involving the indefinite detention of
aliens. 40
A further justification for limiting the Attorney General's statutory
power involved the legislative and executive branches' plenary power in
immigration matters and the Supreme Court's traditional role of defer-
ring to the political branches. '' According to the Zadvydas Court, how-
ever, plenary power is not so plenary, and is therefore subject to
limitations." 2 The Court construed the statute's use of the word "may"
to allow the Attorney General discretion in deportation matters. The
Attorney General's power in deciding the period of detention, however,
was neither absolute nor unlimited. 4 3 The judiciary, therefore, can
review a deportation order without undermining the traditional judicial
deference to the other branches in immigration matters because the issue
is not whether Congress has the right to remove aliens.'44 Congress's
power in creating immigration legislation is undisputed;' 45 the issue on
review was whether the Attorney General can detain an alien for an
137. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 216-17 (1953) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
138. Id. at 207.
139. Id.
140. Notwithstanding Mezei, the Court recognized that aliens, whether excludable or
deportable, are entitled to due process rights if they are physically present in the United States, see
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896),
although circumstances may modify the nature of due process safeguards for such aliens. See
Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982).
141. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695.
142. Id. (referring to INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 941-42 (1983)).
143. In reading the word "may" and Congress's unclear intent, the Court looked to another part
of the INA to find Congress's clear intent regarding terrorists. Id. at 697 (quoting Immigration
and Nationality Act § 507(b)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1537(b)(2)(C)(2000)).
144. Id. at 695.
145. Id.
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indefinite period. 46
After discarding the rest of the Government's arguments, 47 the
Court established that the statute did not permit continued detention
when removal was no longer "reasonably foreseeable." In creating a
six-month limit to the detention period the Court provided a framework
for habeas courts to follow. If the alien has yet to be deported after six
months of detention, then the alien has the burden to show that there is
no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.
The Government must then respond with evidence sufficient to rebut the
alien's proof. If the court finds that removal is not likely within the
reasonably foreseeable future, then it must determine whether the alien
is a flight risk or poses a threat to the community. 48 After establishing
a framework for habeas courts, the Supreme Court then remanded both
cases to the circuit courts for application of this new framework.149 On
remand, the Ninth Circuit rewrote its opinion to reflect the Supreme
Court's "reasonably foreseeable" six-month standard. 5 ° The Fifth Cir-
cuit changed its original disposition and granted Kestitus Zadvydas
habeas relief based on the Supreme Court's standard.' 5 '
In his dissent, Justice Kennedy criticized the Court for overstepping
its bounds and for improperly evading its traditional judicial role.'52
Justice Kennedy first condemned the majority for erroneously overlook-
ing the statutory purpose of protecting the community from dangerous
individuals. 53 Furthermore, placing the burden on the alien to show
that removal is unforeseeable will give the alien little incentive to prove
that his removal is within the foreseeable future.' 54 Although Kennedy
admitted that there is a serious constitutional question embedded in the
area of indefinite detention, he noted that the Court must not ignore laws
which are meant to govern alien status within the United States.
55
Therefore, Justice Kennedy did recognize the existence of due process
146. Id.
147. The Government further argued that release was an exception to the general rule of
detention, and that the history of the statute supported indefinite detention.
148. In providing this framework, the Court did not intend that every alien should be released
after six months; an alien has the burden of showing that there is no significant likelihood of
removal in the foreseeable future. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 700.
149. Although the Court arrived at a conclusion that was reconcilable with the Ninth Circuit's
decision, the Court remanded to the Ninth Circuit because its conclusion may have rested solely
upon the absence of a repatriation agreement between the United States and Cambodia, instead of
an assessment of the likelihood of future negotiations between the two countries. Id.
150. Kim Ho Ma v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2001).
151. Zadvydas v. Davis, 285 F.3d 398, 404 (5th Cir. 2002).
152. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 706 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 707.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 708.
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rights and acknowledged an alien's right to be free from arbitrary or
capricious detention. Limiting an alien's due process rights, however, is
not arbitrary when doing so is necessary to avoid the risk of the alien's
flight, or the alien's danger to the community.
Justice Scalia's dissent, on the other hand, failed to recognize any
constitutional rights for removable aliens. 156 He criticized the majority
for creating a constitutional right of release from detention for aliens
who have already been ordered removed and have lost the right to
remain in the United States. I5 7 Most notable is Justice Scalia's discus-
sion of the majority's use of Mezei. According to Justice Scalia, the
Court erred in distinguishing between deportable aliens in the instant
case and excludable aliens in Mezei.'58 The cases are similar because
both involve aliens who had lost the right to be in the United States.
159
Justice Scalia argued, moreover, that section 241(a)(6) of the INA grants
the authority to detain both classes of aliens, thereby making the Court's
distinction between deportable and excludable aliens irrational and
misplaced. 16
0
V. LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE REACTION TO SEPTEMBER 11, 2001,
IN LIGHT OF ZADVYDAS V. DAVIS
After a long history of denying constitutional protections to aliens
under the guise of the plenary power doctrine, Zadvydas is a break-
through decision within the Supreme Court's immigration jurispru-
dence. 16 1 Deemed the first in a "new era of immigrants' rights,"'' 6 2 the
Court effectively discarded the strongest arguments for limiting constitu-
tional protections of aliens that had been justified by Congress's plenary
power to detain immigrants indefinitely. For the first time, the Supreme
Court acknowledged that noncitizens are entitled to the same protections
as citizens. 163 After the Court's ruling on June 28, 2001, the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service (INS) 164 reported that 3,399 detainees
could be eligible for release under the new six-month reasonably fore-
seeable standard. 165 Hundreds of potential beneficiaries of Zadvydas
included detainees from countries that lacked repatriation agreements
156. Id. at 703 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 704.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 705.
161. David Cole, A Legal Breakthrough for Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, July I, 2001, at AI3.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. On February 28, 2003, the INS ceased to exist and became part of the new Bureau of
Citizenship and Immigration Services within the Department of Homeland Security.
165. Alfonso Chardy, Long-Term Detention Unconstitutional, but ... INS Allows "Special
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with the United States, such as Cuba, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. 166
While the Zadvydas decision provided renewed optimism for many
detainees, September 11, 2001, clouded any hope for a promising new
chapter within immigration law. The terrorist attack on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon was not only an attack on United States soil,
but also an attack on the psyche of the American people. A distortion of
religious views led aliens from the Middle East to commit suicide
attacks, killing Americans and citizens from many parts of the world.
Hours after the tragedy, the American people first learned that the lives
of innocent victims had been irrationally sacrificed because of foreign-
based animosity towards the United States. That moment sparked a
renewed cycle in anti-immigrant sentiment, leading to widespread para-
noia that will perhaps curb any progress that Zadvydas achieved within
the aliens' rights tradition.
In the aftermath of September 11, and in the subsequent debate on
civil rights, Zadvydas is regarded as prophetic because many of the con-
cerns elucidated in the opinion reflect the current debate on aliens' rights
versus national security.' 67 The majority opinion contains language that
can be construed as an exception to the Court's reasonably foreseeable
six-month standard. For example, while condemning the potential ero-
sion of civil rights due to the indefinite detention of deportable aliens,
the Court clarified that its decision was not necessarily applicable in
"special circumstances." '68 Explicitly referring to terrorism, the Court
acknowledged that deference must be given to the political branches in
matters involving foreign policy and national security. "Neither do we
consider terrorism or other special circumstances where special argu-
ments might be made for forms of preventive detention and for height-
ened deference to the judgments of the political branches with respect to
matters of national security."'' 69 In an opinion upholding the constitu-
tional rights of aliens to be free from indefinite detention, this language
can be considered simple dicta or an exception to the rule against indefi-
nite detention. The current national tension and the war on terrorism,
however, might permit this exception to swallow the rule, and allow
Zadvydas to be viewed as a case which actually justifies the Government
Circumstances" for Indefinite Custody, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Nov. 25, 2001, available at 2001
WL 6701457.
166. Tamar Lewin, Deported Immigrants with Nowhere to Go Wait in Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
10, 2001, at B5. Stateless detainees from Middle Eastern countries, however, have not
substantially benefited from the Court's ruling. Id.
167. See Jonathan Ringel, Will New Anti-Terror Tools Pass Court Muster?, LEGAL TiMES, Oct.
8, 2001, at 14.
168. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 696 (2001).
169. Id.
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instead of condemning it in affording less due process rights to aliens.
While the new measures proposed and adopted by Congress and the INS
are necessary to combat terrorist threats by American enemies, the mea-
sures will most likely circumvent any progress achieved within the
aliens' rights tradition at the expense of innocent, non-terrorist aliens.
A. The USA PATRIOT Act
On October 26, 2001, President George W. Bush signed into law
the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT
Act).' 7 ° Among many budgetary and statutory changes that will help
prevent future terrorist acts, Congress amended the INA to heighten
enforcement of immigration violations.' Through section 412 of the
USA PATRIOT Act, Congress added section 236A to the INA, entitled
"Mandatory Detention of Suspected Terrorists; Habeas Corpus; Judicial
Review."' 17 2 Under the new section 236A, Congress granted the Attor-
ney General the power to detain any alien whom he certifies is a sus-
pected terrorist.7 3 Certification occurs if the Attorney General has
"reasonable grounds to believe" that an alien is a security threat or ter-
rorist as already defined in the Act.'7 4 Furthermore, the Attorney Gen-
eral must bring charges against an alien within seven days after
detention, allowing release if the procedural rule is not followed.1
7 5
This provision expands the power to detain, as the previous rule required
that the alien be charged within forty-eight hours after detention. 7 6
Most notable, however, is the language in the new section 236A
concerning indefinite detention. Under the new section 236A, the Attor-
ney General is allowed to detain an alien beyond the ninety-day statu-
tory detention period for removal.17 7  The section incorporates the
"reasonably foreseeable" standard implemented by the Zadvydas Court,
but in such a way that it actually allows the Attorney General to detain
170. Memorandum from James W. Ziglar, INS Commissioner, to the Regional Directors and
Regional Counsel 1 (Oct. 31, 2001), available at http://www.immigration.gov/graphics/lawsregs/
handbook/patriot.pdf.
171. Id.
172. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56 § 412, 115 Stat. 272,
351, available at http://www.immigration.gov/graphics/lawsregs/patriot.pdf.
173. See id. § 412, 115 Stat. 272, 350-52.
174. See id. The USA PATRIOT Act also broadened the definition of "terrorist activity." Id.
§ 411, 115 Stat. 272, 345-50.
175. See id. § 412, 115 Stat. 272, 351.
176. Adam Cohen, Rough Justice: The Attorney General Has Powerful New Tools to Fight
Terrorism. Has He Gone Too Far?, TiME, Dec. 10, 2001, available at 2001 WL 29385648.
177. See USA PATRIOT Act, § 411, 115 Stat. 272, 351.
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indefinitely "only if the release of an alien will threaten the national
security of the United States or the safety of the community or any per-
son."' 78 The Act permits the Attorney General discretion to review an
alien's case every six months and revoke certification. 179 The text of the
new section implements the Court's new standard, yet also implements a
distorted view of the decision based on a narrow interpretation of
Zadvydas.
B. The New Immigration Service Rules
On November 14, 2001, the Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice reported new rules to supplement the existing rules governing cus-
tody of removable aliens.' 8° In light of the Supreme Court's Zadvydas
decision, the Service amended existing section 241.4 of the Code of
Federal Regulations, and created sections 241.13 and 241.14."8" The
existing regulation, section 241.4, provides for automatic administrative
custody review procedures that give a detained alien the opportunity to
present evidence to support his or her release from custody after the
expiration of the ninety-day statutory removal period under the INA,
section 241(a)(3). 82 Section 241.4 applies to aliens that are not consid-
ered to be dangerous to the community or a flight risk.' 83 The existing
section is now accompanied by new provisions that incorporate the
Supreme Court's "reasonably foreseeable standard" as stated in
Zadvydas. 1
8 4
The new section 241.13 applies to aliens who have been admitted
and later ordered removed, other deportable aliens who are determined
to be a danger to the community or a flight risk, and those aliens found
within the United States without inspection who are considered inadmis-
sible. "'85 Section 241.13 governs certain aspects of custody determina-
tion of a detained alien after the expiration of the ninety-day removal
period.86 According to Zadvydas, an alien must provide "good reason
to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reason-
ably foreseeable future."' 18 7 In response to the Court's holding, the new
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Continued Detention of Aliens Subject to Final Orders of Removal, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,967
(Nov. 14, 2001) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 3 and 241), available at 2001 WL 1408247 (F.R.)
[hereinafter Continued Detention].
181. See generally id.; see also 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 (2002).
182. Continued Detention, supra note 180.
183. Id.
184. See generally id.
185. Id. at 56,977; see also 8 C.F.R. § 241.13 (2002).
186. Continued Detention, supra note 180, see also 8 C.F.R. § 241.13 (2002).
187. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001).
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rule establishes a process to determine whether a significant likelihood
that an alien can be removed within the reasonably foreseeable future
exists.'88 If the Immigration Service determines under section 241.13
that no significant likelihood of removal exists, then the alien is placed
into section 241.14 proceedings, where he or she may be subsequently
released subject to strict supervision standards.' 89 The Service can
choose to place an alien that is not likely to be removed within the rea-
sonably foreseeable future into section 214.14 proceedings to justify the
continued detention of the alien due to special circumstances.' 9°
The new section 241.14 was created for those "special circum-
stances" mentioned by the Zadvydas Court that would justify the contin-
ued detention of an alien even if the alien's removal is not likely within
the reasonably foreseeable future.' 9 ' Section 241.14 applies to aliens
who possess highly contagious diseases that pose a danger to the public,
and individuals who are especially dangerous due to a mental condition
or personality disorder. 92 Further, and most significant, section 241.14
applies to those aliens that present foreign policy concerns, 193 and those
aliens that pose national security and terrorism concerns.
94
The Service can place an alien in section 241.14 proceedings due to
foreign policy consequences only if the Department of State advises the
Service to do so.' 95 The Service does not question this advice and fol-
lows the Department's recommendation, allowing no factual considera-
tions or review by an immigration judge. 196 This procedure attempts to
reflect the language used in Zadvydas regarding judicial deference to the
executive branch in foreign policy matters.' 97 Because the Secretary of
State possesses expertise in the field of foreign relations, his policy con-
siderations as to the detention of an alien are not to be questioned.' 98
Continued detention due to national security and terrorism concerns
are determined differently, however. In those cases, the Attorney Gen-
eral is the ultimate decision-maker as to an alien's continued detention
under the new regulation.' 99 The Attorney General makes a predictive
188. See Continued Detention, supra note 180, at 56,968; see also 8 C.F.R. § 243.13 (2002).
189. 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(b) (2002). If the alien does not comply with supervision, the alien will
be placed in custody once more. Id. § 241.13(i).
190. Id. § 241.13(e)(6).
191. Continued Detention, supra note 180, at 56,979.
192. See generally 8 C.F.R. § 241.14 (2002).
193. Id. § 241.14(c).
194. Id. § 241.14(d).
195. Id. § 241.14(c)(2).
196. Continued Detention, supra note 180, at 56,973.
197. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 696 (2001).
198. Continued Detention, supra note 180, at 56,973.
199. 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(d)(2) (2002).
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judgment based on recommendations from the Immigration Service
Commissioner and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion. 2°° The Attorney General then decides the alien's fate based on past
and present conduct, although the regulation permits the Attorney Gen-
eral to reach a determination based on a wide variety of circum-
stances. 20 ' The regulation grants this extreme power to the Attorney
General because of his unique relationship to the intelligence commu-
nity, and his important position within the executive branch.20 2
The changes set forth in the USA PATRIOT Act and the Immigra-
tion Service's new rules extend an inordinate amount of power to the
Government to bypass the Supreme Court's six-month reasonably fore-
seeable standard concerning indefinite detention. Congress and the Ser-
vice did not blatantly ignore the Supreme Court's ruling against
indefinite detention. Rather, Congress and the Service construed as the
holding what was originally considered dicta, and artfully drafted the
regulations tailored to fall within those dicta. While the Zadvydas Court
had principally recognized that due process applies to "all persons
within the United States,"20 3 the Court also mentioned that circum-
stances existed that precluded the application of the Court's decision
against indefinite detention. Proponents of the new measures find justi-
fication within the language of the Zadvydas majority opinion, relying
on a narrow interpretation of the ruling and emphasizing the special cir-
cumstances dictum.
20 4
C. Public Reaction to the New Preventive Measures
While the new measures encouraged by the USA PATRIOT Act
and the Immigration Services rules find justification within the language
of Zadvydas, legal experts and the media have labeled the measures
employed by the authorities since September 11 to be the "antithesis of
due process. '"205 Proponents of the measures, however, claim that the
regulations have not undermined the progressive effect of the Zadvydas
decision.2 06 The Service reported that since Zadvydas and even since
September 11, the Service has released detainees from Iran, Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Jordan. 2 7 According to the Service, these detainees
200. Continued Detention, supra note 180, at 56,973.
201. Id.
202. Id. Furthermore, Congress has granted the Attorney General similar broad authority
within the INA.
203. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (citations omitted).
204. See Chardy, supra note 165.
205. Judy Peres, Concerns Rise of Civil Rights Being Ignored, CHICAcO TRIB., Oct. 16, 2001,
at 8.
206. Lewin, supra note 166.
207. Id.
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proved that they would not pose a threat to public safety and would
comply with surveillance conditions.2 °8 Other proponents argue that the
new measures do not actually deal with the issue of indefinite detention
as reviewed by the Supreme Court.2 9 The regulations merely allow the
Government to revoke the bond of a dangerous alien during the ninety-
day removal period, which was not at issue in Zadvydas.210 The mea-
sures do not allow detention beyond the ninety-day statutory period or
beyond any six-month reasonably foreseeable period.21' Referring to
the exceptions mentioned in Zadvydas, proponents argue that such mea-
sures are "well within the bounds of constitutionality.
212
Attorney General John Ashcroft has attempted to dismiss any criti-
cism offered by civil rights advocates. According to Ashcroft, critics
have overstated the role that the new measures might play in eroding
civil rights.21 3 The Attorney General has assured that the new measures
reflect a meditated balance between security and rights. 2 14 Using the
now infamous discourse on the war against terrorism, Ashcroft accused
critics of the new regulations of aiding terrorists by figuratively supply-
ing enemies with "ammunition" to "erode our national unity and dimin-
ish our resolve. '2 1 - The Attorney General finds validation for the new
measures in a terrorist manual that instructs its members to use Ameri-
can liberties against America.2 16 Ashcroft claims that measures
allowing secrecy in proceedings and extended detention are necessary to
prevent communication among terrorist networks z.2 " Any leeway given
in these proceedings is considered by the administration to be a lost
battle in the war against terrorism.
Many believe, however, that the "war on terrorism" discourse is
misplaced. According to opponents of the new measures, the Attorney
General is mischaracterizing the criticism. 2 18 The issue is not whether
critics are siding with the terrorists, as Ashcroft claims, but whether civil
208. Id.




213. Dan Eggen, Ashcroft Defends Anti-Terrorism Steps; Civil Liberties Groups'Attacks 'Only
Aid Terrorists,' Senate Panel Told, WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 2001, available at 2001 WL 31540631.
214. Id.
215. Id. (citing Attorney General Ashcroft's comments before the Senate Judiciary Committee
on Dec. 6, 2001).
216. Id.
217. Cohen, supra note 176. Initially, the Attorney General claimed that secrecy was
necessary to protect the identities of those detained, "to prevent the creation of [a] McCarthy-style
blacklist." Id.
218. Eggen, supra note 213.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
liberties are preserved in combating the terrorists. 2  Although the
Attorney General and Congress purport to justify the measures even
under Zadvydas, the secrecy involved in current detentions of terrorist
suspects makes it difficult to verify whether the detentions are justi-
fied.22° Critics believe that Congress and the Immigration Service have
erroneously ignored the essence of Justice Breyer's Zadvydas opinion
and have precariously focused on the mere dicta relating to terrorists.
22'
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has characterized the
Zadvydas dicta not as an exception to the reasonably foreseeable rule,
but as a question that the Court left for future consideration. 2  Accord-
ing to the ACLU, the Zadvydas Court did not analyze the constitutional-
ity of indefinite detention of suspected terrorists, and therefore the issue
is still subject to constitutional scrutiny. In the meantime, Zadvydas and
the basic civil liberties entitled to all persons in no way justify the pow-
ers granted to the executive branch to detain suspects in this war on
terrorism.
VI. JUDICIAL REACTION TO SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, IN LIGHT OF
ZADVYDAS V. DAVIS: PATEL V. ZEMSKI
Although the current crisis, paranoia, and tension produced by the
September 1 1 attacks will most likely lead to a narrow interpretation of
Zadvydas and allow the decision to be used as a tool for justifying the
detention of innocent aliens, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has sur-
prisingly followed the true essence of Zadvydas in Patel v. Zemski, 23
the first federal court of appeals decision to consider mandatory deten-
tion of aliens. 24 Vinobhai Bholidas Patel was, like Zadvydas, a lawful
permanent resident for a long period of time and subsequently convicted
of an aggravated felony. 22' After living in the United States for seven-
teen years, Patel was convicted of harboring an undocumented alien and
providing the alien with board and employment at Patel's Dunkin
Donuts businesses. 6 Patel served five months in prison and five
months of home probation.227 Upon his release, Patel was placed in
removal proceedings pursuant to INA section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) and
219. Id. (citing comment delivered by Senate Committee Chairman, Patrick J. Leahy).
220. Cohen, supra note 176.
221. Ringel, supra note 167.
222. Id.
223. 275 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 2001).
224. Tamar Lewin, Appeals Court Overturns Policy on Detaining hmmigrants, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 20, 2001, at A32.
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detained by immigration authorities pursuant to INA section 236(c).2 8
Section 236(c) calls for the immediate detention of an alien who has
been convicted of an aggravated felony.229
The direct issue before the Third Circuit was whether an alien who
is detained under section 236(c) could be detained without an opportu-
nity for an individualized determination of the potential flight risk or
potential danger that an alien can pose to the community.2 30 The court
interestingly pointed out that even alien terrorists are allowed such an
opportunity, yet Patel, who was not charged as a terrorist, had not been
able to exercise this right. 3 ' In short, the issue before the Third Circuit
was whether detained aliens are entitled to the substantive due process
right of freedom from restraint of liberty.
The court recognized that the purpose for the enactment of INA
section 236(c) was to limit the relief available to detained criminal aliens
and expand the categories under the definition of aggravated felony to
allow more criminal aliens to be detained upon their release from
232 Teolprison. The only available relief allowed by INA section 236(c) is in
the event that release would be necessary to protect a witness. 33 Also,
relief from mandatory detention is available if the criminal alien does
not pose a danger to the community or is a flight risk. 34
Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Zadvydas, the Third
Circuit recognized that the Due Process Clause protects all aliens within
the United States, regardless of whether their presence is lawful.2 35 The
point of contention in Patel, however, was the level of due process that
could be afforded to aliens.2 36 Generally, a provision that infringes on a
fundamental liberty interest, such as the right to be free from restraint,
must undergo a strict scrutiny analysis when challenged.2 37 The Gov-
ernment argued that section 236(c) should not be subject to the court's
strict scrutiny since aliens are entitled to less due process rights than
228. Id.
229. Immigration and Nationality Act § 236(c)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (2000). Section 1226(c)(1)
states: "The Attorney General shall take into custody any alien who-(A) is inadmissible by
reason of having committed any offense covered in section 1182(a)(2) of this title, (B) is
deportable by reason of having committed any offense covered in section 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii),
(A)(iii),(B), (C), or (D) of this title."
230. Patel, 275 F.3d at 302.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 304.
233. Id. at 305; see also Immigration and Nationality Act § 236(c)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(2)
(regarding the exception to section 236(c)(I) on mandatory detention).
234. Patel, 275 F.3d at 305.
235. Id. at 307.
236. Id.
237. See id. at 308.
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citizens. 238 The Third Circuit, however, decided not to deviate from the
essence of Zadvydas and concluded that section 236(c) did in fact
impede an alien's fundamental right of liberty.23 9 The infringement was
apparent, especially since Patel had been detained for a total of eleven
months, five months longer than the Zadvydas reasonably foreseeable
period.24 According to the Patel Court, therefore, an alien is entitled to
a substantial amount of due process.
Since aliens are entitled to due process, the court engaged in inter-
est balancing and inquired whether there was a compelling state interest
under section 236(c) to detain an alien without an individualized deter-
mination as to the necessity for an alien's detention.24 ' Relying on the
special circumstances language in Zadvydas, the court stated that a spe-
cial or non-punitive circumstance could outweigh an alien's interest in
liberty. 42 The court considered mandatory detention under section
236(c) a compelling state interest because the Government's power to
deport aliens implies the power to detain, a power that is regulatory in
nature rather than punitive.243
The court concluded that mandatory detention under section 236(c)
without an individualized hearing to determine whether a particular alien
is a flight risk or danger to the community was a violation of the due
process rights of the alien because of the statute's lack of an individual-
ized determination.244 In Patel, therefore, the liberty interest of the alien
outweighed the Government's interest in detaining Patel without an
opportunity to demonstrate that he was neither a flight risk nor a danger
to the community.245
Most notable about the Patel opinion is its advancement of the
aliens' rights tradition while limiting the plenary power doctrine to ques-
tions of congressional policy. The court observed that while Congress
has the power to create policies for alien exclusion, Zadvydas declared
that the authority of Congress in implementing its policies is limited by
constitutional concerns, such as due process.2 46 Congress, therefore, is
not due deference when a policy invades the due process rights of
aliens.247 Although the Third Circuit could have narrowed the holding
of Zadvydas and distinguished the Supreme Court's case on the basis
238. Id. at 307.
239. Id. at 310.
240. Id. at 309.
241. id. at 311.
242. Id. at 309.
243. Id. at 310.
244. Id. at 311-12.
245. Id. at 312.
246. Id. at 307-08.
247. Id. at 308.
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that both cases dealt with different stages in the removal process and
with different statutes, the Third Circuit continued the progress achieved
by the Zadvydas Court.248
VII. CYCLES OF TENSION AND THEIR EFFECTS ON ALIENS
Throughout history, the United States has suffered from paranoia as
a result of tragic events. In the aftermath of a tragedy, Congress usually
passes laws that seek to find those culpable for causing the tragedy.
Such laws, regulations, or procedures are often implemented disregard-
ing usual protections guaranteed under the Constitution. Unfortunately,
aliens, whether lawfully present or not, bear the brunt of the nation's
paranoia in the aftermath of a tragedy. The failure to afford constitu-
tional protections to aliens is based on the difference in status between
citizens and noncitizens. Because noncitizens, or aliens, do not enjoy
the same degree of protection under the Constitution, the Government
feels justified in discriminating or curbing due process rights in an effort
to preserve national stability.
The term "alien" plays an important role in justifying the distinc-
tion between noncitizens and citizens, and consequently in differentiat-
ing their respective enjoyment of due process. 2' 9 The term "alien"
makes noncitizens seem as outsiders coming to invade the status quo of
the nation.2 ° The image of an alien sparks citizen animosity against
foreigners, which is adverse to the ideal of equality among persons of all
races and ethnicities within American society.25'
The term "alien" is itself parsed into a distinction between deport-
able aliens and excludable aliens. 2  A deportable alien, or one who has
lawfully been admitted into the United States and has established lawful
permanent residency, is considered a "good alien. ' 253 Excludable aliens,
on the other hand, are those aliens who attempted to enter the United
States illegally and are thus labeled "bad aliens." '254 Consequently,
"good aliens" receive more due process rights and more favorable treat-
ment by the courts than "bad aliens. '255 The overall effect of the use of
248. The Third Circuit also looked to its own precedent in Ngo v. INS, 192 F.3d 390 (3d Cir.
1999), where the Court afforded due process rights to an excludable alien from Vietnam.
249. Kevin R. Johnson, "Aliens" and the U.S. hnImigration Laws: The Social and Legal
Construction of Nonpersons, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 263 (1997).
250. See generally id. The use of this term masks the human impact of immigration laws,
transforming persons into "faceless, nonhuman, demon 'aliens' ..." Id. at 292.
251. Anti-alien sentiment is especially seen in legislation limiting public benefits. See
generally Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982).
252. Johnson, supra note 249, at 274-75.
253. Id. at 276.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 274-76.
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the term "alien," however, has mostly led to a disparate effect on people
who do not fit within the Anglo-Saxon mainstream.256 Basically, the
mistreatment of aliens under immigration laws and public benefit laws
serves as a hidden justification for racism within the United States. 7
Throughout history, the United States has suffered many traumatic
periods that have sparked alien resentment. Such periods revive cycles
of tension within the American psyche that result in detrimental conse-
quences for foreigners within United States territory.258 In essence,
these periods of national tension have allowed the United States to jus-
tify laws discriminating against aliens and limiting their due process
rights. 9 Particularly, immigration laws are enacted to protect the polit-
ical and social order of the nation.260 The first cycle of tension occurred
after the Haymarket Riots in 1886.26 A bomb exploded in the
Haymarket Square in Chicago during a labor solidarity event.2 62 Several
anarchists were involved in the Haymarket demonstration, thereby giv-
ing rise to concern about anarchist uprising. Several anarchists were
convicted for placing the bomb. As a result, America began to fear for-
eigners, anarchists especially.263
Following the Haymarket Riots, fear of alien anarchists likewise
developed after the assassination of President William McKinley in
1901.264 Even though the person accused of the assassination was a
native-born citizen of the United States, everyone assumed that he was
an alien due to his foreign-sounding last name, Czolgosz. 2 65 Conse-
quently, Congress passed the Immigration Act of 1903, which called for
the exclusion of all anarchists or those who foster the overthrow of the
United States government.266 The law also reflected concern regarding
radicals in the labor movement.267 The Immigration Act signaled a con-
sensus among Americans of a fear of immigrants from Eastern and Cen-
tral Europe who held views which threatened the political and social
256. Id. at 292.
257. Id. at 281-82. Criticism of alien presence within the United States basically focuses on
excuses such as overpopulation that is damaging to the environment, overconsumption of public
benefits, increase in crime rates, and labor issues. Id. at 288-89.
258. See generally Kevin R. Johnson, The Antiterrorism Act, the Immigration Reform Act, and
Ideological Regulation in the Immigration Laws: Important Lessons for Citizens and Noncitizens,
28 ST. MARY'S L.J. 833 (1997).
259. Id.
260. Id. at 836.
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values of the nation.268 The Act was a consequence of an overreaction
against aliens because of an ideology that many citizens and noncitizens
alike possessed.2 69 It was much easier for Congress, however, to enact
the Immigration Act of 1903, an act that would directly impact aliens,
because aliens are not entitled to the same constitutional protections
guaranteed to citizens. The evolution of this fear continued throughout
the Palmer Raids when Congress expanded the Immigration Act to
include more ideological grounds for the expulsion of aliens.27°
The threat of a communist invasion in the United States likewise
provoked another cycle of tension. In Harisiades v. Shaughnessy,27' the
Supreme Court upheld the deportation of three former Communist Party
members under the Alien Registration Act of 1940. The Court
responded to communist fears and the need to limit the role of the judici-
ary in reviewing Congress's laws against Communist threats.272
In the 1970s and 1980s, Congress did not emphasize ideological
restrictions for exclusion, but Congress still retained the power to limit
entry based on ideology. 273 The 1990 Immigration Act even narrowed
ideological exclusions because of the persuasive criticism that such mea-
sures were incompatible with the Constitution.274 With the 1993 bomb-
ing of the World Trade Center, new concerns over terrorism arose.
275
The Antiterrorist Act of 1996, however, surfaced following the
Oklahoma City bombing in April of 1995.276
Although an American citizen planned and effectuated the bombing
of the Alfred T. Murrah federal building in Oklahoma City, the Antiter-
rorism Act penalized many noncitizens who had nothing to do with ter-
277 Anrorism. The Antiterrorism Act of 1996, enacted in response to this
national tragedy, includes special removal provisions for "alien ter-
rorists. ' '278 For example, a removal court is authorized to consider clas-
sified information against an alien that the Government believes might
268. Id. at 844 n.54.
269. Id. at 845.
270. Id. at 848. The Palmer Raids was a campaign initiated by Attorney General Alexander
Palmer to locate subversives responsible for a series of bombings inspired by labor unrest. Id. at
846-47.
271. 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
272. Johnson, supra note 258, at 853.
273. Id. at 861.
274. Id. at 862. Some exclusions were permitted only if the Secretary of State personally
determined that the alien's admission would compromise a compelling United States interest; the
1990 Act also allowed government power to exclude terrorists. Id. at 862-63.
275. Id. at 865-66.
276. See generally id.
277. Id. at 878.
278. Id. at 868.
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endanger national security.279 Such measures are considered to burden
noncitizens by stripping them of rights in the name of fighting terrorism.
The cycles of tension that the United States has experienced
throughout its history and subsequent laws against aliens reflect the
nation's intolerance against certain political views. 280 Because citizens
are protected under the Constitution and aliens are not entitled to the
same rights as citizens, the regulations against aliens are considered to
be an escape valve for the nation's tension. 28 Unfortunately, the ten-
sion is easily released against the most susceptible members of society.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The September 11, 2001 tragedy constitutes a new cycle of tension
within American society. The effects of the tension and paranoia are
quickly revealing themselves in the USA PATRIOT Act and in the new
Immigration Service rules aimed at aliens implicated in the terrorist net-
work. In many respects, these measures are substantially important to
prevent another possible attack on United States soil. Considering pre-
vious periods of crisis and the consequent adverse effects on innocent
aliens, however, the current crisis will very likely lead to a renewed
hostility against aliens in general. As a result of this slippery slope,
innocent aliens will begin to suffer from the unfortunate condition of
being foreigners living in the United States.
The effects of America's current tension are most significantly
revealed in the narrow interpretation of Zadvydas v. Davis. Before Sep-
tember 11, Zadvydas was a breakthrough decision in the area of indefi-
nite detention and aliens' rights. Because the decision held indefinite
detention unconstitutional for resident aliens, the Supreme Court case
had all the characteristics of becoming a seminal case within the aliens'
rights tradition. Like Lynch v. Cannatella, however, many are already
interpreting Zadvydas to stand for the exact opposite of what the Court
essentially held, relying on mere dicta regarding terrorist detention.
Unfortunately, the new preventive measures implemented by the execu-
tive and the legislative branches are quickly eroding the essence of
Zadvydas, transforming the case into a powerful tool for advocating
against aliens' rights. Hopefully, the judicial branch, as already seen in
the Third Circuit's Patel v. Zemski decision, will serve as a buffer to this
279. Id.
280. Id. at 869.
281. See id. at 872.
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erosion and preserve the essence of Zadvydas as a breakthrough case
within the aliens' rights tradition.
N. ALEJANDRA ARROYAVE*
* J.D. 2003, University of Miami School of Law. I would like to express my gratitude to
Professor Irwin P. Stotzky and Joshua D. Poyer. This is dedicated to my mother, Rocio, an
immigrant who came to the United States in search of a better education for her daughter, and
succeeded. [Esto se lo dedico a mi madre, Rocio, que como inmigrante vino a los Estados Unidos
buscando una mejor educaci6n para su hija, y lo logr6.]
